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DISLOYALTY AMONG "MEN IN ARMS":
KOREAN WAR POWS AT COURT-MARTIAL
ELIZABETH LUTES HILLMAN
This Essay analyzes the legal dilemmas that confronted the United
States armed forces and repatriated prisoners of war after the
armistice that ended the Korean War. After surviving a harrowing
internment in POW camps, a handful of soldiers among the
thousands who were returned to the United States were subjected
to court-martial for collaboration with the enemy. This Essay
argues that the prosecutions of POWs for alleged disloyalty reveal
both the anxiety that characterized American politics in the mid-
1950s and the still-arbitrary nature of military criminal
prosecutions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a major
legal reform that military judges, commanders, and judge
advocates were only beginning to understand and implement
during the Korean War.
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INTRODUCTION
[I]t is necessary in time of serious threat to our form of
Government that this country call upon its men in arms to
withstand the horrors of war and prison to prevent an enemy
from destroying that which has been our heritage for at least
167 years. It goes without saying that all men cannot stand firm
against torture, physical violence, starvation or psychological
mistreatment. But in this instance, the record discloses that the
accused weakened when others stood fast, and it does not
reveal that he was compelled to sacrifice his countrymen
because of the use of those influences.1
During the Cold War, millions of Americans stood accused
before military courts, charged with crimes defined by their
commanders and tried according to special procedures set out in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").2 This new code-the
greatest reform in the history of American military law-granted
accused servicemembers basic procedural rights, including access to
counsel and the opportunity to appeal their cases to a court of civilian
judges, for the first time.' The pre-UCMJ regime of military law had
been exposed as harsh and unfair during World War II, leading
veterans and politicians to demand postwar reforms standardizing the
definitions of military crime and affording servicemembers some
degree of due process.4 Whether charged with murder and rape,
going AWOL, disobeying orders, or frequenting gay bars, Cold War
troops had greater legal protections than earlier generations of
American soldiers.
But the fate of those accused of military crimes during the 1950s,
60s, and 70s was determined as much by the context in which the
UCMJ was implemented as by the procedures specified in the new
1. United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.A. 354, 372 (1956).
2. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000).
3. See generally WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND SCALES: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (1973) (sketching the
development and reform of military law from World War II through the Military Justice
Act of 1968); Walter T. Cox, III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The
Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1987) (explaining UCMJ reforms,
particularly the Court of Military Appeals as a civilian appellate judicial body and a right
to counsel in general court-martial proceedings); Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169, 182-84 (1953) (discussing the
creation of the Court of Military Appeals and its jurisdiction as well as procedures in cases
with serious penalties that extend beyond procedures offered in civilian courts).




code. The political and social stresses of the Cold War, felt
throughout American society, rippled through the American armed
forces with special intensity. The civil rights movement, feminism,
open homosexuality, and political dissent posed fundamental
challenges to authority that loomed especially large in the military, an
institution rooted in hierarchy, deference, and tradition. The cases
that moved through the newly reformed military justice system offer a
vivid look at the compromises and conflicts that arose in a society so
invested in order and stability yet cast as a primary defender of
autonomy and freedom.'
This Essay analyzes a highly charged subset of Cold War courts-
martial: the trials of repatriated POWs after a ceasefire ended the
Korean War in 1953. In the history of modern prosecutions for
alleged disloyalty, the Korean War POW cases stand out because the
defendants were servicemen whose crimes took place in POW camps,
an unlikely place to find spies or traitors. The most notorious military
trials of the 1950s, the POW courts-martial targeted a handful of
prisoners accused of collaborating with the enemy in North Korean
and Chinese prison camps.6  They became a public relations
flashpoint for the Cold War armed forces, bringing the unpatriotic
acts of servicemen and a new system of military criminal justice to
center stage.7 The media attention documenting the plight of the
"turncoat GI's" caused heartache among veterans and frustrated
military leaders who sought to turn the public's eye toward more
positive images of America's military exploits.8  For their
distinctiveness and for the insight they offer into the political and
legal atmosphere of the United States during the Cold War, the POW
cases deserve a place in the history of American efforts to identify
and punish disloyalty.
The court-martialed POWs became symbols of the weakness and
disloyalty that military and civilian leaders felt obliged to purge from
5. This work is part of a larger study of how the reformed court-martial of the Cold
War military responded to rapid social change and growing political tension. I elaborate
on these arguments in DEFENDING AMERICA: MILITARY CULTURE AND THE COLD
WAR COURT-MARTIAL (forthcoming 2005). For an earlier version, see Elizabeth Lutes
Hillman, Cold War Crime and American Military Culture: Courts-Martial in the United
States Armed Forces, 1951- 1973 (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
6. See infra Part III.
7. See generally ALBERT D. BIDERMAN, MARCH TO CALUMNY: THE STORY OF
AMERICAN POW'S IN THE KOREAN WAR (1963) (discussing the experiences of American
prisoners of war during the Korean War).
8. See infra Part III.
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the ranks of the Cold War armed forces. But viewing the POWs
convicted for collaborating as merely too weak to withstand the
indoctrination efforts of their Communist captors overlooks the
political, social, and cultural factors that put them at risk of criminal
prosecution. The soldiers prosecuted for disloyalty were mostly those
who had entered military service without the privileges of wealth,
status, or education. Once in the service, the personalities of these
young men failed to win either the support or loyalty of fellow troops,
many of whom engaged in behavior very similar to that of the men
singled out for prosecution.9 Court-martialing a few young soldiers
for apparent disloyalty obscured the larger issue of why
servicemembers might be drawn to Communist doctrine. It also did
nothing to prepare future generations of soldiers for the trauma of
POW camps. Bringing criminal charges against a few POWs enabled
military leaders to shift blame for the military's performance in the
Korean War away from inadequate planning or poor execution by the
armed forces and onto the purported weakness of the rank and file of
the American military.
Neither the military nor its justice system was well equipped to
manage the prisoners' ideological "weakness," more accurately
characterized as vulnerability to Communist indoctrination. The
POW courts-martial were attentive to legal process, and clemency
mitigated the sentences of those convicted. ° But the court-martialed
POWs did not deserve the ignominy of being made criminals for
failing to stand up to communists while imprisoned, nor should they
have been imprisoned by American authorities after finally being
released from long confinements in enemy POW camps. Some of
these soldiers did act to improve their own circumstances relative to
that of fellow prisoners. Their severe punishment, however, resulted
not from their bad acts, but from the vortex of Cold War politics and
recrimination in which they were unwittingly caught up. Most POWs
who acceded to the demands of their captors in prison camps during
the Korean War were not prosecuted; postwar courts-martial
punished only a few among many who were similarly culpable.
Military trials both imposed severe, arbitrary punishments and
ignored the lack of privilege, training, and social skills that led the
POWs into "collaborating" with their Communist captors.
The POW courts-martial inspired criticism from virtually all
sides, revealing the conflict between procedural justice and military
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part III.
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culture. Military judges and practitioners of military law defended
the recently reformed court-martial system against attacks from
across the political spectrum. Military traditionalists doubted
whether the UCMJ, or the new bureaucratic style of the armed forces,
could guarantee performance under fire. To them, the POW courts-
martial were too few, too public, too legalized, and too lenient. Civil
libertarians saw prosecutions for "collaborating" as yet another
example of McCarthyism run amok and blamed the armed forces for
vilifying soldiers whose ideas did not comport to desired political
viewpoints. Veterans resented the disproportionate attention focused
on the few servicemen who had "broken" under Communist pressure
given the many who served diligently, even heroically, throughout the
war. Addressing the alleged ideological weakness of American
soldiers in the formal venue of a criminal trial brought legal values of
process and openness into conflict with military values of deference to
authority and limited disclosure.
The opinions of the military courts in these highly charged cases
reveal the impact of the Korean War on American law and policy
while illuminating the arbitrary prosecutions and political biases that
made fairness elusive at court-martial, even after the reforms of the
UCMJ. Parts I and II of this Essay set the stage for studying the
POW cases. Part I examines the ways in which the politics and
culture of the Cold War affected the post-World War II military. Part
II focuses on how the legal, political, and material circumstances of
the POWs led to eventual criminal prosecutions. Part III reveals how
selective prosecution worked to punish only a few of the many who
suffered long imprisonments in the camps. Part IV details the
exemplary cases of two Army enlistees court-martialed as
collaborators, characterizing their defense tactics and the legal
procedures that governed their trials and appeals. Part V assesses the
broader implications of prosecuting disloyalty at court-martial,
including how the actions of the POWs can be explained and why
prosecutors chose to use military rather than civilian criminal courts.
The Essay's Conclusion places the injustice of the Korean War POW
courts-martial into historical perspective, adding a brief discussion of
the treatment of Vietnam War POWs to this Cold War history of war,
crime, and imprisonment.
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I. "IN TIME OF SERIOUS THREAT": FEAR, WAR, AND CAPTIVES
The armed conflicts of the Cold War era added a new chapter to
the already long series of American captivity narratives." The
capture and imprisonment of thousands of servicemembers during the
wars in Korea and Vietnam sparked fear and outrage reflected in
books, television shows, and movies, including John Frankenheimer's
The Search for the Manchurian Candidate,2 an unsettling political
thriller about mind control and political repression. 3 POWs, real and
imagined, permeated popular culture and redirected academic inquiry
in the United States. 4 Massive increases in government-funded
studies of ideological conversion and mental health were justified by
the specter of American prisoners succumbing to Communist
indoctrination during the Korean War. 5 The Department of Defense
and other agencies invested millions in a search for new psychological
weapons, hoping to reduce the vulnerability of American soldiers to
Communist ideology and to spread American democracy abroad
11. See RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 495-96, 621-23 (1992) (noting the echoes of early
American captivity narratives in late twentieth-century American culture and in the
representation of Vietnam POWs). See generally ROBERT C. DOYLE, VOICES FROM
CAPTIVITY: INTERPRETING THE AMERICAN POW NARRATIVE (1994) ("[T]he civilian
and military captivity narrative is an important literary form, one that has chronicled part
of the American experience for three hundred years."); JILL LEPORE, THE NAME OF
WAR: KING PHILLIP'S WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IDENTITY 125-49 (1998)
(discussing the significance of captivity narratives on developing American identity).
12. THE SEARCH FOR THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE (United Artists 1962).
13. This film, adapted from Richard Condon's 1959 novel and starring Frank Sinatra,
drew parallels between the evils of repressive anti-communism and the "brainwashing"
allegedly practiced by Chinese Communists against prisoners of war. See, e.g., CYNDY
HENDERSHOT, ANTI-COMMUNISM AND POPULAR CULTURE IN MID-CENTURY
AMERICA 136-43 (2003). The film developed a cult following despite being pulled from
circulation after President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963--either because of
Sinatra's concern over the assassination plot of the film or a rumored contract dispute
between Sinatra and United Artists. It was re-released in 1988 to critical acclaim. See,
e.g., Roger Ebert, A Political Satire for the Ages, CHI.SUN-TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at 3,
available at 2003 WL 9578376.
14. See HENDERSHOT, supra note 13, passim; see also RON ROBIN, THE MAKING OF
THE COLD WAR ENEMY: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE MILITARY-INTELLECTUAL
COMPLEX 144-81 (2001) (discussing the focus on rumors of defections by American
POWs).
15. See ROBIN, supra note 14, at 144-81; see also JOHN MARKS, THE SEARCH FOR
THE "MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE": THE CIA AND MIND CONTROL 125-27 (1979)
(detailing the climate in which the idea of brainwashing surfaced and discussing the
resulting studies in which the CIA were involved); CHRISTOPHER SIMPSON, SCIENCE OF
COERCION: COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1945-
1960, at 63-65 (1994) (discussing military commissioned studies of psychological warfare in
the Korean War era).
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more effectively. 16 By the 1960s, military spending on social science
research, most of which involved psychology, reached nearly fifteen
million dollars per year, more than the entire research and
development budget of the military prior to World War 11.17
In 1951, Americans were unaccustomed to either extended
overseas deployments or to seeing young troops captured and
imprisoned by foreign armies for long stretches of time. The newly
permanent, nuclear armed forces faced challenges in the pressroom as
well as on the battlefield as the United States government tried to
maintain a positive image of military service and of American
.democracy. Troubled by the image of soldiers knuckling under to
Communist pressure, military leaders sought out ways to portray
American servicemembers as ideologically resilient and reliably anti-
Communist. President Eisenhower called a press conference in
September 1953 to draw attention to the political education of
servicemembers; Congress held hearings on Communist propaganda;
and military leaders implemented a more aggressive program of anti-
Communist indoctrination.'" The armed forces also adopted a much-
heralded Code of Conduct19 in 1955, hoping to establish and publicize
high standards for the behavior of soldiers under fire and after
capture. 0 The military reacted to the possibility of Communist
sympathizers in uniform by scrutinizing recruits and personnel,
implementing political education programs, and classifying
information.
16. See generally ELLEN HERMAN, THE ROMANCE OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY:
POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF EXPERTS 124-52 (1995) (discussing the
development of psychological understanding in the Cold War period).
17. Id. at 128.
18. See Morris Janowitz, Civic Consciousness and Military Performance, in THE
POLITICAL EDUCATION OF SOLDIERS 55, 65-66 (Morris Janowitz & Stephen D.
Wesbrook eds., 1983) [hereinafter THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF SOLDIERS] (arguing
that "U.S. service personnel held beliefs which worked effectively to protest and insulate
them from communist ideological appeals"). See generally Investigation of Communist
Propaganda Among Prisoners of War in Korea: Hearings Before the Committee on Un-
American Activities, 84th Cong. (1956); Thomas A. Palmer, Why We Fight: A Study of
Indoctrination Activities in the Armed Forces, in THE MILITARY IN AMERICA: FROM THE
COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT 383-94 (Peter Karsten ed., rev. ed. 1986). The
Eisenhower Library's collection includes extensive materials on the military's concern
with psychological warfare as a critical element of Cold War strategizing. See, e.g., White
House Central Files, General File, Box 1184, Folder 150-E, "Psychological Warfare, 1952-
53."
19. See Exec. Order No. 10,631, 3 C.F.R. 266 (1954-1958).
20. The Code has been frequently reprinted in secondary sources. See, e.g.,
RAYMOND B. LECH, BROKEN SOLDIERS 297-98 (2000) (reprinting the Code in its
entirety).
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The armed forces' reaction to the apparent ideological weakness
of their troops did not go unnoticed or unchallenged, however. Like
McCarthy-style anti-Communism, the military's emphasis on
aggressive political education elicited spirited opposition and lasted
only a few years. In 1955, letters streamed into the White House
objecting to the new Code of Conduct.2' Veterans, reservists, parents
of servicemembers, and other citizens wrote from Philadelphia,
Kansas City, Chicago, Boston, Miami, El Paso, Jacksonville and many
other places to protest the religious nature of the Code, its potential
for violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and the
excessive burden it placed on young soldiers.22 In 1961, the Army
relieved Major General Edwin A. Walker of command after his over-
zealous anti-communism led him to remove books from a base library
and denounce civilian officials such as Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara.23 Although the Code of Conduct remained in effect, by
1964 the Army backed off from its most emotionally charged and
controversial political education programs.24 The military continued
to worry about preparing its soldiers to withstand enemy efforts to
21. See White House Central Files, General File, Box 232, Folder 11-H-9, Code of
Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, Eisenhower Library.
22. See id. Servicemembers' rights to free speech, and to some extent, religion, were
qualified versions of the protections the First Amendment guaranteed to civilians. The
Supreme Court did not consider the issue directly until the 1970s. See Captain John A.
Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights
and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303, 303-66 (1998) (reviewing First Amendment
jurisprudence in the military context). Earlier studies of free speech among
servicemembers were triggered by the controversies of the Vietnam era. See generally
John G. Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1697 (1968); Edward F. Sherman, The
Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 325 (1971);
Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, UTAH L. REV. 423 (1977);
Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Inwinkelried, An Evolution in the First Amendment
Overbreadth Analysis and Free Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42
(1975) (discussing two servicemen's challenges to two articles of the UCMJ stemming
from prosecution for conduct that occurred during the Vietnam War); William Saunders
Graf, The Parameters of Free Speech in the Military (1973) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin); Detlev F. Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 187 passim (1957) (offering a pre-Vietnam War analysis of speech
restrictions on military personnel in relation to the First Amendment).
23. Stephen D. Wesbrook, Historical Notes, in THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF
SOLDIERS, supra note 18, at 277-78. Walker gained further infamy after retiring from the
Army when he tried to rally Mississippians to fight the racial integration of the University
of Mississippi. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS, 1954-1963, at 656-65 (1988) (recounting the integration incident at the
University of Mississippi and Walker's involvement).
24. See Wesbrook, supra note 23, at 267-68 (discussing the change from "Troop
Information" to "Command Information").
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recruit spies throughout the ensuing decades, but the political and
cultural atmosphere of the Vietnam era did not permit the same
excesses as the early years of Cold War.
In addition to the fear of communism that changed American
politics and culture, bureaucratic and geopolitical factors also
complicated the world to which the Korean War POWs returned.
Because the UCMJ was implemented in the midst of battle in Korea,
its reforms were neither fully explained to all servicemembers nor
well understood by all military attorneys. 26 The POWs were charged
under the UCMJ for acts committed while the old Articles of War
were still in effect, creating confusion about how to draft appropriate
charges.27 More broadly, the American military was not prepared for
the abrupt start of the war, which increased disciplinary problems and
psychiatric casualties and resulted in troops not ready to bear the
burden of imprisonment in enemy camps.28 The strategic, political,
and military blunders that led the United States and its allies into a
mismanaged war in Korea, combined with a potent fear of global
communism, raised the stakes for the American troops who fought in
Korea and then faced criminal prosecution back in the United States.
II. "THE HORRORS OF WAR AND PRISON": IMPRISONMENT
While heightened fears of communist subversion altered the
political and cultural landscape at home, American troops imprisoned
25. See generally id. (looking at the decline of political training in Vietnam).
26. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Justice in Fatigues: With JAGC in Korea, 14
EXPERIENCE, at 28, 28 (2003) ("Regular Army JAG officers who had worked with the old
system had to be reoriented, and dozens of new JAG officers had to be retrained.").
Meador explains that "[t]he United States thus entered the Korean War with a brand new
military justice system that had never been combat tested and hardly tested at all." Id.
See generally THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
CORPS, 1775-1975, at 203-31 (1975) (describing the substantial changes in military law
reflected in the UCMJ); CAPTAIN JAY M. SIEGEL, ORIGINS OF THE NAVY JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS: A HISTORY OF LEGAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY, 1775-1967 (1997) (discussing the history of Navy administration
in the United States from 1775 until the founding of the Navy Judge Advocate General's
Corps in 1967).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Gallagher, 23 C.M.R. 591, 597-98 (1957) (noting a
charged violation of Article of War 92 that was actually drafted according to article 118(2)
of the UCMJ rather than the Article of War).
28. See LECH, supra note 20, at 3 (quoting Navy Commander Ralph Bagwell's
analysis of POW conduct in Korea as being a result of inadequate preparation); see also
BEN SHEPHARD, A WAR OF NERVES: SOLDIERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 341-43 (2001) (describing the psychological problems experienced
by soldiers during the World Wars, Vietnam, and afterward). See generally DAVID REES,
KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR (1964) (noting personnel and training problems during the
war).
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in East Asia languished, waiting for the signing of an armistice that
was delayed by Cold War politics. The POWs were critical to the
armistice negotiations, which ground to a halt over the issue of
prisoner repatriation.2 9 Convinced that many prisoners in United
Nations camps were impressed into service and did not want to be
returned to China or North Korea, the United States opposed the
simple procedure of forced repatriation set out in the 1949 Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention.30 Instead, negotiators sought voluntary
repatriation, which would permit POWs to decide their own fates.3
Aware of the political impact of "freeing" thousands of North Korean
troops and wary of granting a public relations coup to the Chinese
after making public statements about the number of North Korean
POWs who rejected Communist doctrine,32  the Eisenhower
Administration refused to sacrifice non-forcible repatriation to hasten
the return of U.N. prisoners.33 The United States paid a high price for
this decision: 45% of the war's American casualties took place
between the start of armistice negotiations in July 1951 and their
conclusion in the summer of 1953.34 The POWs were incarcerated
through a war marked by political ambiguity and a postwar
atmosphere rife with uncertainty and recrimination. This Section
details the experience of the POWs and the American media's and
government's reactions to their plight.
29. See generally ROSEMARY FOOT, A SUBSTITUTE FOR VICTORY: THE POLITICS
OF PEACEMAKING AT THE KOREAN ARMISTICE TALKS (1990) (analyzing the controversy
and political climate during and after the war).
30. See FOOT, supra note 29, at 108.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Harry P. Ball, Prisoner and War Negotiations: The Korean Experience
and Lesson, in 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 292, 296-
307 (Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore eds., 1980) (discussing the negotiations and
voluntary repatriation); Howard S. Levie, How It All Started-and How It Ended: A
Legal Study of the Korean War, 35 AKRON L. REV. 205, 222 (2002) (discussing armistice
negotiations).
34. See FOOT, supra note 29, at 208. Although sick and wounded prisoners were
exchanged in a spring 1953 operation termed "Little Switch," the "Big Switch" of
prisoners did not take place until August 1953. Id. The popular 1959 film Pork Chop
Hill-directed by Lewis Milestone, based on a book by S.L.A. Marshall, distributed by
United Artists, and starring Gregory Peck-dramatized the frustration of Americans with
the losses suffered during the lengthy armistice talks. PORK CHOP HILL (MGM/United
Artists 1959). For other Korean War films, see generally PAUL M. EDWARDS, A GUIDE
TO FILMS ON THE KOREAN WAR (1997) (listing Korean War films).
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A. The Camps
Korean War POWs faced conditions of extreme deprivation.
Prisoners endured physical and mental abuse in camps and on forced
marches, especially during the first few months of the war." Official
figures from the Department of Defense reported a death rate of 38%
among American POWs, with close to 3,000 deaths among 7,190
captives.36 A recent study places the death rate at 43%, far higher
than for most prisoners of modern wars.37 In the Vietnam War, for
example, the death rate among the 766 captured Americans was
14%.38 Summary executions and extreme brutality in Korean War
POW camps exacerbated the lack of adequate food, housing, sanitary
facilities, and medical care.
Under such conditions, separating acts of disloyalty from
behavior essential to survival was all but impossible.3 9 Starvation was
the primary means by which prisoners were "trained" to accept
Communist doctrine and to denounce American politics and actions.n
Most POWs gradually capitulated to demands that they study
Communism, espouse its principles, and denounce the United
States.41
35. Abuses took place on both sides of the 38th parallel. See FOOT, supra note 29,
109-21 (discussing the coercion and poor conditions faced by prisoners of the UN forces in
Korea).
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., POW: THE FIGHT CONTINUES AFTER THE BATTLE;
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRISONERS OF
WAR 79-82 (1955). But see BIDERMAN, supra note 7, at 91-113 (arguing convincingly that
both the total number of prisoners and the reported death toll were likely
underestimates).
37. LECH, supra note 20, at 2.
38. Lech also notes that the only comparable rates of death in modern warfare are the
rate of Germans who died after being captured by Russians on the Eastern Front during
World War 11 (45%) and the rate of Russians who died in German camps during the same
war (60%). See LECH, supra note 20, at 2.
39. The difficulty of distinguishing willful disobedience from the consequences of
inexperience and fear was a problem in courts-martial triggered by events outside the
POW camps as well. It was the "fog of war" (Clausewitz's term for the confusion and
stress of battle) that led an Army board of review to reverse the convictions of two
infantrymen in United States v. McCoy, 13 C.M.R. 285 (1953), who had been court-
martialed for failing to execute successfully their orders to take a hill in the midst of a
Korean War firefight. See id. at 286.
40. See LECH, supra note 20, at 3. BROKEN SOLDIERS reconstructs the prisoners'
harrowing experiences through some 60,000 pages of recently declassified documents. Id.
41. Id. at 92-108 (reconstructing the depth and breadth of prisoner cooperation with
Communist indoctrination); see also MARKS, supra note 15, at 126-31 (noting the results
of communist mind control tactics on American soldiers and describing both Soviet and
Chinese approaches to brainwashing).
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B. Reactions
Even the military's harshest critics recognized the psychological
and physical strain prisoners lived under in Chinese and North
Korean camps,42 but media coverage of the alleged collaborators was
mixed. Newspaper and magazine accounts of the POWs tended to
blame defects in American culture and morality for the weakness of
servicemembers; "give-up-itis," a purportedly contagious tendency to
quit under fire, was coined to describe the weaknesses of the
American soldier in Korea.43 The inability of captive Americans to
escape from the camps attracted extensive media criticism.44 No one
successfully escaped from a Chinese or North Korean prison camp
during the war.45 Americans seemed to recognize the hardships of the
camps but nonetheless found fault with the prisoners who succumbed
to the pressure.
Military officials and social scientists defended the POWs,
arguing that their behavior was comparable to that of prisoners in
past wars and that those who capitulated were victims of
"brainwashing." Although there was no Chinese word for the
concept, American journalist Edward Hunter translated the Chinese
hsi nao as "wash brain," introducing the expression into American
English.46 Also referred to as "coercive persuasion" or "menticide,"
42. See, e.g., Text of Inquiry Findings on Marine Col. Schwable and Comments by
Defense Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1954, at 16; see also BIDERMAN, supra note 7, at
61-63 (criticizing Kinkead's failure to address the coercion methods used on American
POWs); LECH, supra note 20, at 3, 52-53 (discussing starvation). The military press did
not cover the POWs as closely as the civilian press; very limited coverage of the POW
cases appeared in the Army Times, a widely distributed military newspaper. For a sample
of the cartoons that occasionally depicted POWs in the military press, see ARMY TIMES-
VETERANS' EDITION, Aug. 22, 1953, at 16; ARMY TIMES- VETERANS' EDITION, Aug.
15, 1953, at 18.
43. See BIDERMAN, supra note 7, at 19-21 (offering a critique of "give-up-itis" in
terms of similar conceptions in prior wars); see also DON J. SNYDER, A SOLDIER'S
DISGRACE 173 (1987) (discussing "give-up-itis").
44. ROBIN, supra note 14, at 162; see also TOM ENGELHARDT, THE END OF VICTORY
CULTURE: COLD WAR AMERICA AND THE DISILLUSIONING OF A GENERATION 65
(1995) (noting that twenty-one American POWs actually defected to China).
45. E.g., LECH, supra note 20, at 136. This fact inspired the title of Eugene Kinkead's
popular book on the POWs in Korea. See EUGENE KINKEAD, IN EVERY WAR BUT ONE
15 (1959).
46. See generally EDWARD HUNTER, BRAIN-WASHING IN RED CHINA: THE
CALCULATED DESTRUCTION OF MEN'S MINDS (1971) (describing the development of
brainwashing techniques in Communist China). I am grateful to Marilyn Young for
pointing out the questionable accuracy of Hunter's translation. See also HUNTER, supra,
at 308-09 (noting how many American POWs of the Chinese thought they had not been
treated well upon their release); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA 45 (1961)
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brainwashing was thought to reduce resistance through techniques
such as isolation, sleep deprivation, inadequate food and sanitation,
assignment of repetitious tasks, threats, assaults, and forced acts of
betrayal.47 It became a popular explanation for the POWs behavior
among cultural observers who feared both the frailty and alienation
of post-World War II American society.48 POWs, defense attorneys,
and commanding officers alike tended to explain the widespread
acquiescence of American troops to Communist indoctrination as
part of the physical and emotional toll of captivity rather than as a
sign of disloyalty.49
At its core, the "brainwashing" explanation for collaborating
POWs is convincing. Most soldiers who became dedicated
Communists in the camps were fighting to survive or hoping to
improve their living conditions, not making principled decisions or
objective choices among political systems. Abuse and coercion shape
virtually every experience of imprisonment, a reality that was no
doubt clear to the military leaders who elected not to prosecute the
vast majority of POWs who could have been tried under the UCMJ.
This coercion was at the root of the brainwashing rationale, which
effectively shifted blame from the American military, and from the
United States itself, onto the deceptive tactics of an unseemly enemy.
(arguing that the Chinese Communist program of "thought reform" was "one of the most
powerful efforts at human manipulation ever taken," and that it was much more "total"
than other programs used in Chinese schools, universities, prisons, and business and
government offices); MARKS, supra note 15, at 125 (confirming this linguistic point and
noting the more accurate translation of hsi nao as "to cleanse the mind"); ANDREW J.
PAVLOS, THE CULT EXPERIENCE 51-52 (1982) (noting that "[s]ome experts of the
Korean War prefer the term coercive persuasion rather than brainwashing because the
stress was on controlling POW's rewards and punishments and not on classical or
Pavlovian conditioning techniques"); Letter from Edward Hunter to the New York Times
Book Review Editor, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Mar. 29, 1959, at 24 (complaining about a
review that overlooked Hunter's two books on brainwashing).
47. See generally Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a
Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ('Brainwashed') Defendant, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1978) (summarizing these and other brainwashing practices in discussing how the
law should treat "brainwashed" defendants).
48. See ROBIN, supra note 14, at 169-70; see also TIMOTHY MELLEY, EMPIRE OF
CONSPIRACY: THE CULTURE OF PARANOIA IN POSTWAR AMERICA, at vii (2000)
(discussing the author's conception of an "intense anxiety about an apparent loss of
autonomy-the conviction that one's actions are being controlled by someone else"); Carl
Landauer, Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought, 12
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 179-95 (2000) (arguing that social and political science writers
of the 1940s and 1950s felt that "modern society in the United States was pathological, and
its myth-laden irrationalism raised the threat of a totalitarian society").
49. See, e.g., LECH, supra note 20, at 229-60 (detailing the general court-martial
proceedings for several Korean War POWs).
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By displacing other explanations-like the potential appeal of
Communist doctrine to American troops-that military leaders found
less palatable, brainwashing served the United States' political goals
while helping to articulate the psychological trauma of the POWs
experiences. The armed forces were willing to excuse most, but not
all, of soldiers' misconduct in the camps as a result of psychological
and physical coercion and abuse.
III. "ALL MEN CANNOT STAND FIRM": SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
Although commanding officers realized how bad the conditions
were in the POW camps, they still felt obliged to enforce certain
standards of military discipline upon those who returned from
imprisonment. Deciding how to identify and punish soldiers who
appeared to reject American democratic ideals in favor of
Communism, or had otherwise acted inappropriately in the POW
camps, was at least as difficult as crafting a response to the political
challenges of the war. This Part discusses how military and
government leaders elected to press charges against just a few of the
thousands of soldiers who could have been prosecuted for violating
military law in the camps.
The most potent weapon at commanders' disposal was the
general court-martial, a criminal forum that could punish
servicemembers with fines, reductions in rank, imprisonment, and
even death. 0 Although the court-martial was rarely used during the
Cold War compared to its use under earlier regimes of military law,
the military decided to court-martial some of the repatriated Korean
War POWs for collaborating with the enemy.5" However, these
accused POWs were the exception, not the rule, in the treatment of
repatriated prisoners. Military sociologist Albert Biderman argued
that the military legal system, in sharp contrast to the opportunistic
and naive reactions of many journalists and scholars, functioned as a
model of restraint in choosing not to prosecute most repatriated
Korean War POWs.52 Even the Army, the service most damaged by
reports of collaborating prisoners and most aggressive in prosecuting
50. See generally FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1999) (outlining the procedural and substantive rules, military
acronyms, and related practices unique to military criminal law); DAVID A. SCHLUETER,
MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1999) (describing
the substantive underpinning of court-martial and delineating court-martial procedure).
51. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 78. The court-martial rate in general dramatically
declined during the Cold War. Id. at 69-110.
52. BIDERMAN, supra note 7, at 223-26.
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them, sought to limit the need for courts-martial by expanding the
powers of commanders to censor servicemembers through other
means, such as non-judicial punishment under article 15 of the
UCMJ.53 Military officers during the Cold War resorted to the court-
martial only in extraordinary situations, turning instead to alternative
disciplinary tools to address routine misbehavior.
Commanding officers knew that many prisoners were guilty of
some degree of cooperation with their captors 4.5  The military's
exhaustive debriefing of the 4,000 repatriated POWs revealed that
most violated the regulations allowing prisoners to provide only their
name, rank, and serial number to captors." More than 500 prisoners
were investigated for alleged misconduct in the camps.56  FBI
investigators reported on many POWs who signed peace petitions
and wrote to family members urging that they oppose the war.57 Most
POWs, despite their efforts to resist the demands of their captors,
faltered under the physical abuse and psychological coercion of the
camps.
The newly reformed military justice system treated a small
minority of the total instances of prison camp collaboration as serious
offenses, convicting just eleven men at general courts-martial for
excessive cooperation with the enemy. 8 A scant fourteen of the 4,000
repatriates were brought to trial.59 Only the POWs vilified by fellow
soldiers during the debriefing process, whose actions in the camps
became public and embarrassed military leaders, or who did not
manage to turn the tide of public opinion in their favor, were
prosecuted for criminal conduct in the POW camps.6'
53. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Constitutional Rights of Servicemembers Before Courts-
Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 144-46 (1964) (discussing the Army's disciplinary
problems among American POWs and the resulting congressional authority for more
article 15 punishments).
54. See LECH, supra note 20, at 104-06.
55. See id. (discussing the impossibility of adhering to the name, rank, and serial
number regulation).
56. See BIDERMAN, supra note 7, at 30 tbl. 1 (detailing the breakdown by branch of
service of former POWs investigated after the war, totaling 565).
57. See White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, Records, 1952-1961, FBI Series, Box 3, Folder S(1), Eisenhower Library.
58. See LECH, supra note 20, at 212-13.
59. See id. (listing the servicemen prosecuted). See generally George S. Prugh, Jr., The
Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 678, 678-707
(1956); George S. Prugh, Jr., Prisoners at War: The POW Battleground, 60 DiCK. L. REV.
123, 123-38 (1956).
60. See LECH, supra note 20, at 212-15. Lech strongly critiques the inconsistency in
the handling of the courts-martial of the fourteen soldiers who had been Korean War
POWs. Lech cites the decentralization of the process, which yielded disparate results in
2004] 1643
1644 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82
Despite the UCMJ's goal of standardizing criminal procedure
across the Department of Defense, the Code preserved the
prosecutorial discretion of commanders, subject to the guidance
provided by each branch of service. 61 The absence of a centralized
authority to control investigation and prosecution left the Air Force,
the Army, and the Navy to make their own decisions about whether
or not to pursue courts-martial. Every one of the POWs court-
martialed was in the Army, a distinction partly explained by Army
troops' disproportionate representation among the prisoners. There
were 224 men each from the Air Force and Marine Corps and 31
from the Navy among the 4,000 repatriated POWs; the remainder of
the repatriated prisoners were Army troops.62  Service-specific
policies, as well as overall numbers, also determined the fate of
former prisoners. The Air Force, top-heavy with officers and nervous
about protecting the secrecy and legitimacy of its programs, was much
more reluctant to prosecute returning POWs than the Army.63 No
repatriated Air Force personnel were court-martialed, nor were any
of the 134 Air Force officers who refused to fly assigned wartime
missions in 1 95 2 .6 This "fear of flying" incident involved less than
one percent of the Air Force personnel qualified to fly, but the
cases with similar facts. Id. at 214. He also notes the ability of certain soldiers who had
passed their enlistment period to avoid a military trial by simply accepting their discharge.
Id. at 214-15.
61. See, e.g., GENEROUS, supra note 3, at 34-53 (discussing the debate over
"command control"). Critics of the Cold War military justice system have derided the
extent of commanders' discretion to prosecute offenses. See generally LUTHER C. WEST,
THEY CALL IT JUSTICE: COMMAND INFLUENCE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM
(1977) (detailing the pernicious effects of commanders' influence on military lawyers and
courts-martial outcomes). For more recent critiques, see generally Kevin J. Barry, A Face
Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission Recommendations to
Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.
L. 57, 117-18 (discussing the problem of disparate outcomes in prosecution for similar
offences because of prosecutorial discretion); Richard B. Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in
the Military Justice System: Is It Time for a Change?, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 395 (1992);
Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps?, 28 Sw. U. L.
REV. 481 (1999).
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supra note 36, at 81. One Marine Corps officer
avoided court-martial when a court of inquiry cleared him, though the investigation
effectively ended his career. See LECH, supra note 20, at 266-67 (noting the stigma faced
by Colonel Frank Schwable after the war).
63. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 93-97 (discussing the difference in court-martial
rates between the branches of the armed forces).
64. On the fear of flying incident, see VANCE 0. MITCHELL, AIR FORCE OFFICERS:
PERSONNEL POLICY DEVELOPMENT, 1944-1974, at 92-98 (1996). See SNYDER, supra
note 43, at 146 (arguing that the relatively lax regulations of the Air Force, along with
other relevant evidence of the collaboration of POWs who were not charged at court-
martial, was suppressed at the POW trials).
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publicity it generated and the precedent it set caused great concern
among military leaders.65 The dissenting pilots included sixty-seven
officers training to fly the B-29 bomber for General Curtis LeMay's
Strategic Air Command.6 LeMay favored prosecuting the resisters,
most of whom were reservists with families and civilian careers who
had been recalled to duty for the Korean War.67 In April 1952, twelve
officers were charged at court-martial. But when six of the accused
went public to allege maltreatment by the Air Force, the Secretary of
the Air Force ordered the courts-martial be stopped.' The pilots
ended up with administrative discharges rather than punitive
dismissals, sparing the officers the humiliation of courts-martial and
the Air Force the spectacle of criminal trials.69  Army leaders,
however, adopted more heavy-handed tactics, hoping to make
examples of a few collaborating prisoners and willing to risk a public
relations backlash.
The extremely selective nature of the POW courts-martial
reveals how this reduced use of court-martial made military trials
more rare but also more damaging to the careers and reputations of
servicemembers who were prosecuted. Although the reforms of the
UCMJ were intended to standardize and legalize military justice, the
decision to prosecute a handful of repatriated POWs demonstrates
that courts-martial still operated in arbitrary, politicized ways.
IV. "THE ACCUSED WEAKENED WHEN OTHERS STOOD FAST":
THE CASES OF TWO CORPORALS
The prisoners who appeared to collaborate willingly with the
indoctrination program of the prison camps, termed "progressives"
by the Chinese and by the other POWs, were at greatest risk of court-
martial after the war.70 POWs convicted for collaborating with the
enemy were punished through dishonorable discharges and prison
terms ranging from two years to life, though most were released by
parole boards after a few years of confinement in military prisons.71
Seven of the fourteen courts-martial of POWs resulted in extensive





70. See LECH, supra note 20, at 5.
71. See id. at 264-76 (discussing the fate of each court-martialed POW). For a
narrative account of Ronald Alley's effort to clear his name and a crusade taken up by his
family, several politicians, and a journalist after his death, see generally SNYDER, supra
note 43.
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appellate records, six of which involved explicit charges of political
dissent, including making statements against the interests of the
United States and then publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise
drawing attention to such statements.72  This Part analyzes the
appellate record of these courts-martial for insight into both the
behavior that compromised the military careers of the POWs and cost
some their postwar freedom and the armed forces' rationale for
pursuing charges against these repatriated prisoners.
The cases of Corporals Edward M. Dickenson and Claude J.
Batchelor set the tone for other POW trials.73  Because of the
publicity that attended their intertwined trials, the lengthy appellate
records their convictions generated, and their modest enlisted rank
(nine of the fourteen prosecutions targeted enlisted troops), their
courts-martial exemplify the challenges facing prosecutors, defense
counsel, judges, and commanders in the POW cases.74 Batchelor and
Dickenson were inexperienced troops captured soon after the start of
the war.75 Each led Communist indoctrination efforts among fellow
troops at a prison camp in Pyoktong, North Korea, and each initially
refused repatriation, belatedly returning to United States custody,
Dickenson in October 1953 and Batchelor in January 1954.76 The
young men were charged with similar crimes, convicted, and
72. See United States v. Fleming, 23 C.M.R. 7, 11-12 (A.B.R. 1957), affd, 7 C.M.A.
543 (1957); United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A. 460
(1957); United States v. Gallagher, 21 C.M.R. 435, 438 (A.B.R. 1956), rev'd, United States
v. Gallagher, 7 C.M.A. 506 (1956); United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 149 (1956);
United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 464 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A. 354 (1956);
United States v. Dickenson, 17 C.M.R. 438, 441 (A.B.R. 1954), affd, 6 C.M.A. 438 (1955);
United States v. Bayes, 22 C.M.R. 487, 488 (A.B.R. 1956); United States v. Floyd, 18
C.M.R. 362, 363 (A.B.R. 1955). Floyd is the only case that did not include a charge of
collaboration with the enemy.
73. The trials of Specialist Third Class Thomas Bayes and Master Sergeant William H.
Olson involved charges and claims on appeal similar to those that appear in Batchelor.
Sergeant James C. Gallagher was convicted of unpremeditated murder for throwing sick
and helpless prisoners out of his tent and into cold winter nights to freeze to death, but
Gallagher was also charged with cooperating with the camp guards in a manner similar to
Batchelor. See Framing, 23 C.M.R. at 596. Gallagher was sentenced to a dishonorable
discharge, total forfeiture of pay, and confinement for life. See Gallagher, 7 C.M.A. at 507.
74. For a list of the name and rank of each soldier court-martialed for their actions in
POW camps, see LECH, supra note 20, at 212-13. Private First Class Rothwell Floyd was
the only soldier of a grade lower than corporal to face court-martial-and his is also the
only case in which charges of malicious crimes in POW camps did not include political
offenses. Because soldiers were sometimes promoted during their imprisonments and
then demoted after conviction at court-martial, their ranks vary in documents that appear
in the appellate records. I refer to POWs by the ranks they held at the time of their
captures.
75. See id. at 33-37.
76. See id. at 189-90.
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sentenced to long prison terms.77 Their cases reveal the mix of
individual hardship, global politics, personal enmity, and public
relations that shaped the prosecution of collaboration at court-martial
during the Cold War. The armed forces attempted to use courts-
martial, in highly selective fashion, to bolster the impression of
steadfast, loyal young troops while disregarding the possibility of
legitimate criticism of the American political economy.
A. Captured
Young, uneducated, and poorly trained, neither Batchelor nor
Dickenson anticipated the ordeal the Korean War would bring.
Claude Batchelor was the second of eight children born to a poor
family in a small town near Waco, Texas.78 Restless, he quit school
and enlisted in the Army at the age of sixteen.79 Sent to Japan in
November 1948, Batchelor was assigned to play trumpet in the First
Cavalry Division band and soon married a Japanese woman. 0 When
war broke out in July 1950, he found himself en route to Korea as an
infantryman in the Eighth Cavalry.8' In November 1950, after several
months of fighting, Batchelor and the other members of his patrol
were captured by Chinese forces.82 Singled out as a leader among the
POWs by the Chinese and flattered by the attention, Batchelor
chaired a prisoners' "Peace Committee," led discussion groups
intended to teach the principles of communism, confessed to alleged
wartime atrocities (including "germ warfare") committed by
Americans, and lectured on the injustices of the Rosenbergs' trial,
Jim Crow laws, and the Ku Klux Klan.83 An October 1952 letter that
Batchelor sent to his hometown newspaper, The Winkler County
News in Kermit, Texas, detailed the evils of American biological
warfare and capitalism.8" Batchelor also testified that he had
intended to continue studying communism upon his return to the
77. See id. at 266-68.
78. See id. at 33.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 33-34.
81. See id. at 34.
82. See id. at 34-36 (describing the events leading to Batchelor's capture).
83. See United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 466 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A.
354 (1956). The record focuses in particular on Batchelor's statements about the U.S.
practice of germ warfare, right down to details about ants infected with chemical agents.
See id. at 482. This was a key issue for the Chinese and North Koreans; quite a few
Americans, including the Marine pilot Colonel Schwable, spoke out about the extent of
American biological warfare. See LECH, supra note 20, at 173-78 (describing the
interrogation of Schwable that led to his "confession" of germ warfare).
84. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 481-82.
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United States and that he had made preliminary plans for creating a
Communist organization of former American POWs."
Like Batchelor, Edward Dickenson was assigned to the over-
matched forces of the rapidly disintegrating Eighth Cavalry in the
winter of 1950.86 He surrendered to North Korean forces in
November 1950 after losing contact with his company.87 One of
thirteen children born to a working-class Virginia family, Dickenson
completed school through the sixth grade.88 At age twenty, he was
two years older than Batchelor when captured but had been in the
Army only seven months.89 Dickenson was another "progressive" in
the camps; he led pro-Communist discussion groups, sent recordings
to his parents criticizing the United States, wrote editorials to his
hometown newspaper (The Post in Big Stone Gap, Virginia), and
informed his captors about other prisoners' escape plans.9"
In the camps, both men seemed willing to speak and write about
the shortcomings of the United States and eager to gain the approval
of their captors. Their cooperation brought extra food, money,
cigarettes, and liquor from guards and may have worsened conditions
for other prisoners.91 Some POWs testified that Batchelor had helped
them by sharing food and cigarettes, but others accused him of
reporting to camp authorities on the activities of less cooperative
soldiers. 92  Dickenson's testimony about Batchelor's role in the
Chinese "trial" of an American POW proved especially damning.93
According to Dickenson, Batchelor had ingratiated himself with the
Communist camp leaders by recommending that an American POW,
considered a spy by the guards, be shot for his disloyalty to
communism.94 That sort of behavior crossed the boundary between
the compromises that soldiers were expected to make in order to
85. Id. at 473-81.
86. See LECH, supra note 20, at 36; United States v. Dickenson, 17 C.M.R. 438, 443
(A.B.R. 1954), aff'd, 6 C.M.A. 438, 455 (1955).
87. See LECH, supra note 20, at 36.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See United States v. Dickenson, 17 C.M.R. 438, 442 (A.B.R. 1954), affd, 6 C.M.A.
438, 455 (1955).
91. See LECH, supra note 20, at 155-56.
92. See id. at 196.
93. See United States v. Batchelor, 7 C.M.A. 354, 362 (1956).
94. The prisoner who Batchelor condemned was not killed; Master Sergeant Wilburn
Watson survived to join Dickenson in testifying at Batchelor's court-martial. See
Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 492, affd, 7 C.M.A. at 361-62. Batchelor denied that he




survive and the realm of the criminal, a judgment that would become
clear at Batchelor's trial.
The impoverished backgrounds, poor military preparedness, and
limited education of these two corporals made them receptive to the
Communist education they received in the POW camps. It also
helped lead to their capture and to their inability to marshal enough
support upon their returns to the United States to avoid the disgrace
of criminal prosecution. Many other servicemembers during the Cold
War suffered from similar social and economic disability during and
after their military careers, but few were subjected to the harsh
consequences visited upon Batchelor and Dickenson.
B. Court-Martialed
After their delayed repatriation, Batchelor and Dickenson were
interviewed at length by American intelligence officers and
psychiatrists who already knew quite a lot about the corporals from
interrogations of other POWs.95 Both men cooperated; Batchelor
even provided a 148-page description of his conduct in the camps that
was later admitted into evidence-over the strenuous objections of
his defense counsel-at his court-martial.96  Soon after their
interviews with Army intelligence, the corporals became the subjects
of pre-trial criminal investigations resulting in massive reports
recommending prosecution.' This Part traces their courts-martial
and appeals, analyzing the meaning and impact of the judicial
opinions the POW cases elicited.
Dickenson's court-martial, the first POW trial involving charges
of collaboration, took place in 1954, while the Army-McCarthy
hearings were in session.98  Despite the military's promise of
immunity from prosecution as part of his agreement to return to the
United States, Dickenson was convicted and sentenced to ten years
confinement.9 9 The Secretary of the Army eventually reduced his
sentence to five years, and he was released from Fort Leavenworth
95. See LECH, supra note 20, at 203-12 (describing the post-repatriation interrogation
of the POWs).
96. See id. at 242.
97. Id. at 217-18.
98. See id. at 237. For a discussion of McCarthy's targeting of the Army, see ELLEN
SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 260-65 (1998). See
also ROBERT GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF FEAR: JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY AND THE
SENATE 243-69 (1987) (discussing the Army-McCarthy hearings as "unique annals of
Congress and the nation"); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, A CONSPIRACY SO IMMENSE: THE
WORLD OF JOE MCCARTHY 355-471 (1983) (discussing the Army-McCarthy hearings).
99. See LECH, supra note 20, at 238, 266.
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after serving three and a half years.'
Batchelor's court-martial followed Dickenson's in September
1954.11 It took nearly twice as long, provoked more complex judicial
rulings on evidentiary standards, and involved testimony from dozens
of psychiatrists and other POWs. 1°2  Because the opinions in
Batchelor's case are more detailed and expansive, and because they
cover virtually all of the issues raised in Dickenson's and other POW
courts-martial, the balance of this Part focuses on the trial and
appeals of the unfortunate Claude Batchelor.
Batchelor chose a civilian attorney to defend him,103 reflecting
the doubt of many accused servicemembers about the true allegiances
of military attorneys."°  He rejected the two experienced judge
advocates assigned to act as his defense counsel under the UCMJ's
guarantee of free legal representation from the pre-trial investigation
through the appeals process. 05 His legal team acted aggressively on
his behalf, submitting pre-trial discovery requests for thousands of
government documents-most of which were denied on grounds that
the material requested was not relevant to the charges-and pursuing
simultaneously a number of strategies at trial.
0 6
One of those strategies was the brainwashing defense, also
known as the "fence complex syndrome."'17  Batchelor's defense
counsel sought to blame Batchelor's failures in the camp on the very
same phenomenon that many military leaders as well as journalists
believed responsible for most incidents of prisoner cooperation with
Communist captors.108 Dr. Leon Freedom, a psychiatrist, described
Batchelor's "political psychosis," a sort of compartmentalized
paranoia that prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong "in
the political sphere."'0 9 Neither Dr. Freedom nor Batchelor himself,
however, managed to create a reasonable doubt about his guilt in the
minds of the members of his court-martial. Batchelor's court-martial,
like the military itself, chose to blame the corporal's own weakness
for his compliance with camp guards rather than to recognize the
100. See id.
101. See id. at 241.
102. See United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 489 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A.
354 (1956).
103. See LECH, supra note 20, at 241.
104. See id. at 236.
105. See id.
106. See Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 513.
107. Id. at 489.
108. Id.
109. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 489.
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power of communist indoctrination or the authority of psychiatric
experts.
Despite widespread public sympathy for the plight of court-
martialed POWs, Corporal Batchelor was convicted of "aiding the
enemy," "misconduct as a prisoner of war," and violating article 134,
the UCMJ's general article.110 Sentenced to a dishonorable discharge,
total forfeiture of pay, and twenty years confinement, he spent four
and half years in military prison before his parole."' A trumpet
player turned infantryman, Batchelor had finally managed to impress
his school teachers. Because these particular teachers were
communists in a POW camp, he was caught in the vise of Cold War
politics and paid a steep price for his compliance.
United States v. Batchelor"2 elicited more than seventy pages of
opinions from military appellate courts.'13 It provoked judicial
pronouncements on mental competence, jurisdiction, and a host of
other legal issues.114 The military's highest court conceded that
evidence of Batchelor's guilt was "overwhelming" but still carefully
analyzed procedural issues raised by his attorneys.115 These included
conflicts between the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ concerning
jurisdiction over the offenses of POWs, doubt over whether Batchelor
had accepted an offer of amnesty by returning to American custody,
and uncertainty about the consequences of the psychological theories
of coercion advanced at trial."6 The Court of Military Appeals's
measured tone and exhaustive review of Batchelor's case shows how
seriously the new military courts viewed their responsibility to ensure
procedural justice at court-martial, and how important the POW
cases were to the new military justice system's effort to build
legitimacy and develop military legal doctrine.
110. See LECH, supra note 20, at 237-38 (recounting public support for Dickenson in
particular); see also Court-Martial Appeal Letters, Box 254, General File Series of White
House Central Files, Eisenhower Library (documenting public support for Dickenson and
other POWs). For Batchelor's sentence and ultimate punishment after clemency and
parole board actions, see LECH, supra note 20, at 267-68.
111. See LECH, supra note 20, at 267-68.
112. 19 C.M.R. 452 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A. 354 (1956).
113. See Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452 (A.B.R. 1955).
114. See id.
115. United States v. Batchelor, 7 C.M.A. 354, 359 (1956).
116. See Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 492, 506.
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V. "THAT WHICH HAS BEEN OUR HERITAGE": PUNISHING
DISLOYALTY, PROTECTING THE NATION
In addition to their key place in the historical development of a
new military criminal justice system, the POW trials raised deeper
issues of Cold War politics and American culture. Both the courts-
martial themselves and media coverage of them revolved around why
Batchelor and others "turned," and what sort of crime their acts
constituted. This Section analyzes two theories put forth to explain
why some POWs cooperated with the communist program in the
camps, then assesses the legal reasoning that led to their prosecution
for military-specific charges at court-martial rather than for treason in
federal court.
A. Brainwashed?
The question lurking behind judicial opinions, media coverage,
and psychological studies of the POWs was why Batchelor and other
"progressives" allegedly "weakened when others stood fast." '117
Because the Army refused to acknowledge that most captured
soldiers cooperated with Communist indoctrination in order to
survive in the camps, military and civilian observers sought to
understand, and then remedy, the situations or traits that made
soldiers vulnerable to Communist coercion. Perhaps the simplest
explanation of all-that Communist thought was genuinely appealing
to some Americans-was dismissed out of hand. Instead, soldiers
who embraced Communism were assumed to be either helpless
victims or damnable traitors. Allegations of brainwashing, and
recognition of the suffering imposed on those who resisted
communist indoctrination, partly answered the question about the
apparent political vulnerability of POWs. But the appeal of
Communist doctrine itself contributed to the alleged "weakness" of
soldiers in the camps.
The Communist critique of the United States could not help but
resonate with at least some American soldiers. Communism
questioned the wisdom of American involvement in a war that, truth
be told, had gone very badly for U.N. troops. The Communist
syllabus learned and then taught by POWs like Batchelor and
Dickenson included substantive critiques of racial inequality and the
uneven distribution of wealth in the United States. 18  Claude
117. Batchelor, 7 C.M.A. at 372.
118. See Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 466, aff'd, 7 C.M.A. 354 (1956); United States v.
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Batchelor himself explained that three years of reading Communist
literature had changed his beliefs, though he was quick to add that his
return to the United States led him to reconsider his new political
ideology."1 9 Most captured servicemembers were not the sons of
privilege; they often joined the Army to escape the social and
economic limitations of their families and communities.120 The FBI
investigated and reported on "any pertinent derogatory information"
discovered about the POWs who were investigated for collaboration,
including at least a few who had connections to the Communist Party
in the United States. 121 But the FBI, along with military leaders and
the social scientists who so exhaustively studied the POWs, ignored
the class and racial tensions that shaped military culture as well as
American society during the post-World War II period. They chose
instead to focus on soldiers' feeble mental state rather than
acknowledge the possible appeal of Communist thought to some
servicemembers. 122 Individual soldiers might falter while "others
stood fast," but the military, and the nation as a whole, were unwilling
to stand fast and ignore the conversion of Batchelor to an ideology as
anathema to American democracy as Communism.
Military officials, social scientists, and journalists instead turned
to more elaborate explanations for POW vulnerability. Batchelor's
defense counsel tried to portray his client as mentally incompetent by
virtue of "political psychosis" so that Batchelor's court-martial would
see an addled young soldier rather than a bright, committed
Communist. 3 As the Court of Military Appeals wrote in upholding
Dickenson, 17 C.M.R. 438, 441 (A.B.R. 1954), affd, 6 C.M.A. 438 (1955); LECH, supra
note 20, at 98-99 (presenting the twelve-step indoctrination).
119. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 470.
120. See LECH, supra note 20, at 29-38. On the difficulty of military recruiting in this
period, see generally THE DRAFT AND ITS ENEMIES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 159-
219 (John O'Sullivan & Alan M. Mecker eds., 1974); GEORGE Q. FLYNN, THE DRAFT,
1940-1973, at 110-65 (1993) (discussing the Korean War draft and changes made to draft
policy in the 1950s); JAMES M. GERHARDT, THE DRAFT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ISSUES IN
MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT, 1945-1970 (1971) (discussing the difficulties in
meeting military personnel needs in the post-World War II period).
121. See Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to
the President (May 14, 1953) (available in White House Office Files, Office of the Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Records, 1952-1961, FBI Series, Box 3, Folder
S(1)) (Eisenhower library) (discussing recent POW repatriates) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Hoover writes that the FBI review found "derogatory
information" on only a dozen of the repatriates, none of whom were court-martialed. See
id.
122. On the blind spot of social scientists regarding race, ethic, and class divisions
among the returning POWs, see ROBIN, supra note 14, at 181.
123. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. at 489-94.
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his conviction, "[A]t best, he was a victim of his own selfish desire to
improve his internment at the expense of other servicemen; at worst,
he was a soldier who betrayed his cause." '24 At best an opportunist,
at worst a traitor, Batchelor was seen as a potentially dangerous
convert who intended to organize a Communist cell in the United
States. The threat he posed to American leaders struck too close to
one of their greatest fears, that of subversion from within, to be
overlooked as a consequence of coercion, abuse, or psychological
disorder.
B. Not Quite Treason
The White House and the Attorney General considered the
possibility of charging Batchelor and the other "turncoat GI's" with
treason in federal court rather than with lesser crimes at court-
martial.125 Government prosecutors during the Cold War often had a
choice of prosecuting explicitly political crimes in either federal or
military court. Limitations attached to each forum. For example,
although the UCMJ permitted the prosecution of capital crimes that
occurred within the geographic boundaries of the United States at
court-martial during peacetime-which had not been possible under
earlier regimes of military law-the Code still limited sharply the
cases in which the death penalty could be imposed. 26 The UCMJ's
general article, under which suspected spies were often charged, was
explicitly limited to "crimes and offenses not capital."'2 7  Federal
prosecutors also lacked a criminal charge as all-encompassing as the
UCMJ's general article, which could make the drafting of charges
more difficult. In 1954, the Espionage Act, a federal law under which
servicemembers as well as civilians could be charged, was amended to
allow prosecutors to seek the death penalty for peacetime violations,
124. United States v. Batchelor, 7 C.M.A. 354, 372 (1956).
125. See Notes on Press Conference Briefing (July 6, 1955), Dwight D. Eisenhower
Papers, Whitman File, 1953-1961, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diary Series, Box 6, Folder
ACW Diary July 1955 (6), Eisenhower Library (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Eisenhower makes clear that the rules on handing "Turncoat GIs" ought to be
public and notes that "some legal question whether they can be tried for treason or
whether they should be tried under the Court of Military Justice. Attorney General wants
to reserve his decision." See id.
126. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 18, 52, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-894 (2000)
(restricting the imposition of death except as specifically authorized elsewhere in the
Code). For a discussion of the UCMJ's extension of jurisdiction over capital crimes
committed during peacetime, see generally Robert B. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The
Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13
VAND. L. REV. 435, 435-53 (1960).
127. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934.
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which made capital punishment more available in federal than
military court.128 To complicate matters further, when federal charges
were brought at court-martial, military appellate courts had to sort
out a jumble of criminal law to determine whether servicemembers
could be tried under a military statute (the UCMJ) that specifically
disavowed capital offenses, for violations of a civil criminal statute
(the Espionage Act) that authorized the death penalty.129  Even
'peacetime" itself was subject to interpretation; military judges had to
define the beginning and end of the undeclared wars in both Korea
and Vietnam in order to apply the UCMJ properly, since both
substantive crimes and procedural rules specified in the statute were
different in peacetime than during war.13°
In the POW cases, the crime of treason, defined in the
Constitution as either "levying War" against the United States or
"adhering to their Enemies," loomed over court-martial proceedings
and appeals.13' The word "treason" was introduced by both a
prosecuting attorney and a member of the court-martial panel during
Batchelor's trial, making explicit the connection between the charged
military crimes of collaboration and the ultimate political crime. 32
Practically, treason was rarely charged because of the constitutional
constraints on its prosecution. 133 It was not a specified crime under
the UCMJ and has not been charged at modern courts-martial. In
addition, the fact that the acts of the POWs had taken place while
128. See Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954, Pub .L. No. 777, 68 Stat. 1216 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). See generally Elizabeth B. Bazan, Espionage and
the Death Penalty, 42 FED. B. NEWS & J. 615, 618 (1994) (discussing changes to 18 U.S.C.
§ 794 regarding capital punishment and the death penalty); Paul D. Kamenar, Death
Penalty Legislation for Espionage and Other Federal Crimes Is Unnecessary: It Just Needs
a Little Re-Enforcement, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 881 (1989) (discussing the
constitutional validity of the death penalty in espionage cases).
129. See, e.g., United States v. French, 25 C.M.R. 851, 866-87 (A.F.B.R. 1958), affd, 10
C.M.A. 171 (1959).
130. See Major Wayne Anderson, Unauthorized Absences, ARMY LAW., June 1989, 3,
at 15 (discussing military court rulings on the definition of "in time of war" for Korea and
Vietnam).
131. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. For a history of treason in the United States, see
generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1981) (discussing
several prominent treason cases); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN
THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS (1971). On the blurring of lines between
treason and other crimes, see Ryan Norwood, Note, None Dare Call It Treason: The
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Peacetime Espionage, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 820,
820 & n.26 (2002) (discussing the difference between treason and other crimes).
132. See LECH, supra note 20, at 241-42.
133. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 42 (1993) (describing the harm of treason as constitutionally defined and
less concrete than that of other criminal offenses).
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imprisoned by enemy forces caused considerable doubt as to whether
their misdeeds legally constituted treason."'
Although the court-martialed POWs did not face the possibility
of capital punishment, the capital crime of treason influenced the
tone and outcome of the trials.15  As at least one observer of
American political crime has noted, treason punishes lapses of loyalty
to the state, breaches of "a relationship of required loyalty.' 13 6 Of all
Americans, Cold War servicemembers were among those required to
have the most unchallenged loyalty to the United States. The charges
brought against the collaborating POWs were stand-ins for the charge
of "adhering" to an enemy of the United States-albeit not an enemy
by virtue of a declared war-that a prosecution for treason would
have exposed. The stigma of disloyalty, on top of the taint of political
corruption and weakness that tarnished the public image of Korean
War POWs, made it very difficult for accused servicemembers to
convince the fellow soldiers who judged them of their innocence.
CONCLUSION
The political atmosphere that led military prosecutors to try
young men like Batchelor and Dickenson as traitors did not survive
the Cold War years. By the end of the Vietnam War, the Army's
attitude toward using the military justice system to punish
collaborating POWs had shifted closer to the Air Force's perspective
in the "fear of flying" episode. The broader waves of dissent that
came with the Vietnam War and the social and cultural changes of the
1960s made criminal prosecution for political dissent more difficult to
justify. The courts-martial of Korean War POWs had been costly,
painful, and embarrassing. Afterwards, criminal prosecution was
considered an inappropriate and overly punitive means of dealing
with the issue of delayed repatriates and prisoners who cooperated
with their captors.
Two decades later, only one late-returning prisoner from the
134. Some believe the actions of imprisoned soldiers legally constituted treason,
arguing that the POWs committed overt acts before many witnesses with the intent to
betray the United States and give aid and comfort to enemies of the state. See Henry
Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to Afghanistan, 29 ST. LOUIS L.
REV. 181, 194-204 (arguing in favor of treason charges for Korean POW Batchelor and
Vietnam POW Garwood).
135. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 18, 52, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-894 (2000)
(restricting the imposition of death except as specifically authorized elsewhere in the
Code). For the UCMJ's extension of jurisdiction over capital crimes committed during
peacetime, see Duke & Vogel, supra note 125, at 435-58.
136. FLETCHER, supra note 132, at 42.
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Vietnam War was prosecuted and convicted.'37 Private First Class
Robert R. Garwood was the only Vietnam POW tried for
collaborating with the enemy.13 8  Although the geopolitical and
military situation of the Vietnam War was not the same as in the
Korean War-the protests of the Vietnam era had no parallels in the
1950s, and the Vietnam War resulted in some 700, not 7,000 POWs, as
the Korean War had-Garwood's pre-service life and wartime
experience echoed that of Batchelor and Dickenson. Frequently in
trouble as a teenager and anxious to escape an unsteady home life,
Garwood enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1963 as an alternative to an
Indianapolis juvenile detention center.139  He was captured in
Vietnam in 1965, a young, inexperienced soldier much like Batchelor
and Dickenson. 140 Garwood lived with North Vietnamese and
Chinese forces until 1979, refusing repatriation and adopting
Vietnamese language, dress, and customs. 141  The Marine Corps
tracked his activities from 1966 until he returned to United States
custody.1 42 Two years after his voluntary return, Garwood was court-
martialed in a trial extending over eleven months, including ninety-
two days of court, and resulting in sixteen volumes of trial record and
exhibits. 143  Garwood employed multiple defense counsel who
countered the testimony of other POWs about Garwood's
preferential treatment and relative freedom in Vietnam by
introducing psychiatric testimony that doubted Garwood's mental
competence and suggested a possible brain injury."44 The trials and
appeals also inspired allegations of judicial misconduct and selective
prosecution, attracting intense media attention.45
Like Batchelor and Dickenson, the military's treatment of
Garwood was not the norm; most returning POWs, even those who
had joined peace committees and signed confessions of misconduct
while imprisoned, were not prosecuted for military crimes. 46 But
because Garwood manifested little resistance to Communist
137. See United States v. Garwood, 16 M.J. 863, 865 (N-M.C.M.R. 1983), affd, 20 M.J.
148 (C.M.A. 1985).
138. Garwood, 16 M.J. at 865, affd, 20 M.J. 148 (C.M.A. 1985).
139. See WINSTON GROOM & DUNCAN SPENCER, CONVERSATIONS WITH THE
ENEMY: THE STORY OF PFC ROBERT GARWOOD 107-12 (1983).
140. See id. at 13-20.
141. See generally id. (presenting a narrative of Garwood's experience).
142. See id. at 334.
143. See Garwood, 16 M.J. at 865.
144. See GROOM & SPENCER, supra note 138, at 347.
145. See id. at 347-94 (presenting trial tactics and chronology).
146. Id. at 335.
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indoctrination, because he spurned repatriation with other prisoners
in 1973, and, perhaps most importantly, because other POWs "hated
him while they were in the camps" and were willing to testify against
him, he was singled out for punishment.147 The Marine Corps had not
pursued courts-martial against any of the Marines who cooperated in
Korean War prison camps, but by 1979, the Corps was unwilling to
excuse the highly publicized behavior of a troubled soldier,
notwithstanding the costs of a lengthy criminal trial. 48 Still, Garwood
remained the exception, not the rule. By the 1970s, the military
actively sought to minimize the possibility of embarrassing, politicized
criminal trials and appeals.149
The crimes of Batchelor, Dickenson, Garwood, and other court-
martialed POWs were caused by a combination of Communist
coercion and the servicemen's lack of education, poor training, and
inability to forge protective friendships with fellow troops. These
young men were blamed for the military's cultural and institutional
failures even when other servicemembers with apparently greater
culpability and whose cases attracted comparable publicity-such as
the United States Air Force germ warfare contingent-escaped
without criminal censure.1 50 Military courts handled the complex
legal issues of these cases with diligence and gravity, but the selective
prosecution and harsh punishment of the POW courts-martial did not
fulfill the UCMJ's promise of standardized justice and procedural
fairness.
The Korean War POW cases became important precedents for a
legal process in transition to a more "civilianized" criminal justice
system in Cold War America. Decisions in Batchelor's and the cases
of other POWs established key precedents in the development of
modern military criminal justice by analyzing the ramifications of the
First Amendment for servicemembers' right to speak and act, 5' the
147. Id. at 340-44.
148. Id. at 335.
149. Id.
150. See LECH, supra note 20, at 266.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Bayes, 22 C.M.R. 487,489-91 (A.B.R. 1956) (analyzing a
free speech challenge to an article 104 charge). The Court of Military Appeals relied on
United States v. Voorhees, another Korean War case, in rejecting Bayes's appeal. 4
C.M.A. 509 (1954). Lieutenant Colonel Melvin B. Voorhees had been convicted and
dismissed for publishing a book about his experiences in Korea without the approval of
military authorities. Id. at 515-16. His case prompted the court to elaborate on the
limited right to free speech that could be claimed by servicemembers. Id. at 521. On the
intent required for a conviction under article 104, see United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R.
461, 464 (A.B.R. 1955), affd, 7 C.M.A. 460 (1957). See also United States v. Levy, 39
C.M.R. 672, 677-81 (A.B.R. 1968) (the case of Army doctor Howard Levy during the
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extent of criminal jurisdiction over POWs, 152 and the determination of
mental competence.153 Yet these cases have been overlooked, much
like the war-the "forgotten war"-from which they came. For their
role in the evblution of military legal jurisprudence as well as the
window they offer into the complex political and legal terrain of the
United States during the Cold War, the Korean War POW cases
deserve to be more than a forgotten chapter in the history of criminal
prosecutions for disloyalty.
Vietnam War). See generally Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-
Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 839 (discussing the Levy trial and
related social issues).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Garwood, 20 M.J. 148, 149 (1985) (accepting the validity
of UCMJ's criminal statutes over prisoners in POW camps).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 489-98 (A.B.R. 1955)
(analyzing the brainwashing defense put on by Corporal Batchelor), affd, 7 C.M.A. 354
(1956).
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